Home / Library / Car Accidents

Massachusetts Legal Answer · Car Accidents

Does Not Wearing a Seatbelt Hurt My Massachusetts Car Accident Claim?

Not wearing a seatbelt does not bar a Massachusetts injury claim, and every time the question has reached a Massachusetts appellate court the injured person has won. The usual explanation for why is wrong, though, and the difference matters to your case. M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 13A requires belts and sets a twenty-five dollar fine, and it contains no sentence keeping non-use away from a civil jury. The shield most people have in mind sits in a different statute, M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 7AA, and it reaches child restraints and safety belts for passengers under 13. For an adult, the so-called seat belt defense is an open question in Massachusetts, and the Supreme Judicial Court has said so directly. Defendants lose the argument on causation rather than on a rule: they fail to prove that a belt would have prevented or reduced the injuries. That causation requirement, not a statutory ban, is what actually protects your recovery.

What Section 13A Actually Says

M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 13A is the Massachusetts seat belt statute. Its official heading is Seat belt use required; exemptions; penalty, and that heading is an accurate summary of everything in it.

The duty is broad, and it is not limited to the front seat. The statute opens: No person shall operate a private passenger motor vehicle or ride in a private passenger motor vehicle, a vanpool vehicle or truck under eighteen thousand pounds on any way unless such person is wearing a safety belt which is properly adjusted and fastened. Six exemptions follow, lettered (a) through (f): children under twelve who fall under sec. 7AA, occupants of vehicles built before July 1966, people who cannot use belts for a certified medical reason, rural mail carriers on duty, people in taxis and liveries and heavy trucks and buses, and side facing seats in antique cars with no factory belt.

The penalty is small. A driver, or a passenger sixteen or older, who is unbelted shall be subject to a fine of twenty-five dollars, and the driver owes another twenty-five dollars for each unbelted passenger between twelve and fifteen. Enforcement is secondary: The provisions of this section shall be enforced by law enforcement agencies only when an operator of a motor vehicle has been stopped for a violation of the motor vehicle laws or some other offense. The statute also keeps the ticket off your insurance: A violation of this section shall not be considered as a conviction of a moving violation of the motor vehicle laws for the purpose of determining surcharges on motor vehicle premiums pursuant to section one hundred and thirteen B of chapter one hundred and seventy-five.

That is the whole statute. There is no sentence about negligence, no sentence about evidence, and no sentence about civil proceedings of any kind. Many published summaries of Massachusetts law say that sec. 13A blocks a defendant from telling the jury you were unbuckled. It does not say that, and it never has.

The Shield Is Real, but It Is in Section 7AA

The Legislature does know how to write an evidentiary shield, and when it wants one it writes it plainly. M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 7AA is the child restraint statute, and its official heading tells you what is inside: Child passenger restraints; fine; violation as evidence in civil action.

Section 7AA requires that A passenger in a motor vehicle on any way who is under the age of 8 shall be fastened and secured by a child passenger restraint, unless such passenger measures more than 57 inches in height. For older children not covered by that rule, a passenger in a motor vehicle on any way that is under the age of 13 shall wear a safety belt. Then comes the sentence that people mistakenly attribute to sec. 13A: A violation of this section shall not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in any civil action.

The same drafting shows up elsewhere in Massachusetts traffic law. The bicycle statute, c. 85, sec. 11B, requires helmets for riders sixteen and under and then adds A violation of clause (ii) or (iii) shall not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in any civil action.

So the pattern is clear. Where the Legislature wanted to keep a safety rule out of a civil case, it said so in one sentence. It said so for child restraints. It said so for bicycle helmets. It did not say so for adult seat belts. A full text search of the Massachusetts General Laws returns nine sections mentioning a safety belt and four mentioning a seat belt, and sec. 7AA is the only one carrying an evidence clause.

If your child was the injured passenger, the sec. 7AA shield is the rule that governs, and it is a genuine one. That situation is covered separately in Massachusetts booster seat laws.

What Massachusetts Courts Have Actually Decided

Three appellate decisions make up the entire Massachusetts authority on the seat belt defense. In all three the injured person won, and in all three the court went out of its way to avoid deciding whether the defense exists.

Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352 (1973). A passenger was hurt when her seat gave way. Ford asked her on cross-examination whether she had her belt on, the judge excluded the question, and the SJC held that was proper because Ford never explained what it intended to prove. The court was explicit that non-use by itself proves nothing: Standing alone, an answer that the plaintiff was not wearing the seat belt would have been insufficient to submit the seat belt issue to the jury. It then reserved the question: We express no opinion whether the seat belt defence would have been appropriate in this case, if clearly presented, nor whether it would be appropriate in other circumstances. A footnote pointed at where the argument would live if it ever succeeded: If a duty to wear a seat belt did exist, as to a post-December 31, 1970, accident, the comparative negligence statute would seem to be the appropriate means for dealing with the seat belt defence.

MacCuish v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 380 (1986), S.C., 400 Mass. 1003 (1987). A fifteen year old passenger died in a van rollover. The trial judge told the jury her belt use was not an issue, and the Appeals Court affirmed, but on a narrow ground: the plaintiff had won on breach of warranty, and a plaintiff’s own negligence is not a defense to a warranty claim. The court declined the broader question in one sentence: Since the seat belt defense is not available against the warranty theory, we need not decide whether the defense may be asserted against the negligence claim.

Shahzade v. C.J. Mabardy, Inc., 411 Mass. 788 (1992). This is the closest Massachusetts has come. A driver stopped in traffic was rear ended, was not wearing her belt, hit her head on the steering wheel, and eventually lost much of the vision in one eye. The jury awarded her $300,000. The defendant had asked the trial judge to instruct the jury on comparative negligence based partly on her failure to buckle. The judge refused, and the SJC affirmed for a reason that is the heart of this whole subject: the defendant has not presented any evidence of causation tending to show that all or some of the plaintiff’s injuries would have been averted or minimized if she had been wearing a seat belt. Without that proof, the court said, the jury would have been left to speculate. And then, once more: on this record, we need not address whether Massachusetts courts should recognize the so-called seat belt defense.

Why the Question Is Still Open

Notice what those three cases have in common. Not one of them announced a rule. Each disposed of the seat belt argument because the defendant had brought the wrong theory or no proof, which let the court leave the underlying question for another day. No reported Massachusetts appellate decision has decided it since 1992.

The ground has also shifted underneath those cases. The crashes in them happened in 1967, 1980 and 1984. In Breault the SJC pointed out that the statute on the books at the time required seat belts to be installed in cars, not worn by the people in them, so there was no statutory duty to buckle at all. Today there is one, in sec. 13A. A defendant arguing the seat belt defense now would start from a place none of those three defendants could: an actual statutory requirement that the plaintiff broke.

That argument would run through the comparative negligence statute, M.G.L. c. 231, sec. 85, exactly as the Breault footnote predicted. Section 85 provides that The violation of a criminal statute, ordinance or regulation by a plaintiff which contributed to said injury, death or damage, shall be considered as evidence of negligence of that plaintiff, though it adds that such a violation does not by itself bar recovery.

There is a real obstacle in the way of that route, and it favors you. Section 85 speaks of a violation of a criminal statute, ordinance or regulation, and a seat belt ticket is not criminal. M.G.L. c. 90C, sec. 1 defines a civil motor vehicle infraction as an automobile law violation for which the maximum penalty does not provide for imprisonment, sec. 13A carries nothing but a fine, and sec. 13A itself sends a driver who wants to contest the citation to the civil procedure in c. 90C, sec. 3. No Massachusetts appellate court has resolved how those provisions fit together.

None of that is a reason to worry about your claim. It is a reason to be careful about anyone, including a website, who tells you the question is settled. It is not settled, and the honest answer is more useful than a comfortable one.

What a Defendant Would Actually Have to Prove

Here is the practical protection, and it is stronger than most people expect.

Shahzade sets the bar: evidence tending to show that all or some of the plaintiff’s injuries would have been averted or minimized by a belt. That is not an argument a defense lawyer can make from the podium. It requires proof, which in practice means a qualified expert who can testify about how a specific body moved in a specific collision and what a belt would have changed about a specific injury. That expert has to survive the plaintiff’s challenge to their methods, and the opinion has to fit the actual crash. In Breault the SJC noted the injury came from a seat that broke loose, and observed that the plaintiff might have been hurt as badly or worse if belted. In MacCuish there was no evidence the seat would have stayed put if the belt had been fastened.

Section 85 also puts the burden in the right place. The burden of alleging and proving negligence which serves to diminish a plaintiff’s damages or bar recovery under this section shall be upon the person who seeks to establish such negligence, and the plaintiff shall be presumed to have been in the exercise of due care. The defendant carries the load, and you start with the presumption in your favor.

What This Means When You Talk to an Adjuster

Settlement negotiations are not a trial, and no evidence rule constrains what an adjuster says on the phone. If a claim representative brings up your seatbelt, expect one of two things: an attempt to discount the file cheaply, or a genuine belief that Massachusetts recognizes a defense it has never adopted.

Either way, the response is the same and it is factual rather than rhetorical. No reported Massachusetts appellate decision has ever permitted a jury to reduce an injury award because the plaintiff was unbelted. Sec. 13A carries a twenty-five dollar fine and no evidentiary consequence. And the causation proof that Shahzade requires is expensive, contested, and frequently unavailable. Those are the reasons the discount is not worth what the adjuster hopes you think it is worth.

Do not argue this yourself on a recorded line. What you say about how you were seated, where you were struck, and how you moved in the vehicle becomes the raw material for exactly the causation opinion the defense needs. That risk is covered in giving a recorded statement to an insurance company and in dealing with the insurance adjuster after a Massachusetts car accident.

Comparative Negligence, Stated Correctly

Massachusetts uses modified comparative negligence under M.G.L. c. 231, sec. 85. The statute provides that contributory negligence does not bar recovery if such negligence was not greater than the total amount of negligence attributable to the person or persons against whom recovery is sought, which means you still recover unless your own share of fault is greater than the combined share of everyone you are suing. When you do recover, any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is made.

That is the machinery a seat belt argument would have to run through, and it is the same machinery that handles ordinary driving fault: speeding, following too closely, distraction. Those allegations are about how the crash happened and they have nothing to do with what you were wearing. The full treatment is in comparative negligence in Massachusetts, and how insurers build these arguments into a number is in Massachusetts car accident case value.

Your PIP, UM and UIM Benefits, and the Tort Threshold

The Massachusetts PIP statutes, M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 34A and sec. 34M, do not mention seat belts anywhere. PIP is paid without regard to fault, and there is no belt condition in either section. Your own insurer owes those benefits whether or not you were buckled. More detail is in PIP and personal injury protection in Massachusetts.

Before you can sue an at fault driver for pain and suffering, you generally have to clear the serious injury threshold, and that test looks at the nature and severity of your injuries rather than at your belt. See the serious injury threshold to sue after a Massachusetts car accident.

One caution on uninsured and underinsured motorist claims. Those are usually resolved in arbitration rather than in court, and an arbitrator is not bound by trial evidence rules the way a judge is. The causation problem the defense faces is the same, but the forum is not, so treat a UM or UIM arbitration as a place where the seatbelt question can be raised and has to be answered on the proof.

What to Expect if You Retain Jim Glaser Law

If a seatbelt question is in your file, the work is specific. It means reading the statute rather than repeating what the internet says about it, identifying whether the defense has any causation proof at all, and preparing the medical and biomechanical evidence that meets it if it does. It also means knowing which arguments are genuinely available to the other side, because a claim built on the belief that seatbelt evidence is categorically barred is a claim built on a mistake.

Jim Glaser Law can be reached at (617) JIM-WINS, and the line is answered 24 hours a day. The first telephone consultation is free. Injury matters are typically handled on a contingency fee, meaning the attorney’s fee is a percentage of any recovery and there is no fee if there is no recovery, and under Massachusetts practice the client may remain responsible for costs and expenses. If it is easier than calling, you can ask to have the firm reach out to you instead.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: I was not wearing a seatbelt and was seriously hurt in a Massachusetts car accident. Can the other driver’s insurance use that against me?

A: Not wearing a seatbelt does not bar your claim, but it is not categorically off limits either. M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 13A requires belts and sets a twenty-five dollar fine, and it says nothing about evidence or negligence. The Supreme Judicial Court left the adult seat belt defense undecided in Shahzade v. C.J. Mabardy, Inc., 411 Mass. 788 (1992), and no reported Massachusetts appellate decision has recognized it since. To get anywhere with it, a defendant would have to produce evidence that a belt would have averted or minimized your specific injuries, which is a proof problem defendants have not solved in any reported Massachusetts case.

Q: Does M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 13A prohibit using seatbelt non-use as evidence of negligence?

A: No. That is a widely repeated error. The text of sec. 13A contains no reference to negligence, to evidence, or to civil proceedings; its official heading is Seat belt use required; exemptions; penalty. The provision people are thinking of is M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 7AA, which says a violation of that section shall not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in any civil action. Section 7AA governs child passenger restraints and safety belts for passengers under 13, not adults.

Q: If I sue, will the jury find out I wasn’t wearing a seatbelt?

A: There is no Massachusetts statute that automatically keeps it out, so the answer depends on the case. A defendant who wants the jury to hear it has to connect it to your injuries with real evidence. Shahzade holds that without evidence of causation showing your injuries would have been averted or minimized by a belt, the issue does not go to the jury at all, because the jury would be left to speculate. In practice that means the fight happens before trial, over whether the defense has an admissible expert opinion.

Q: Does not wearing a seatbelt affect my PIP benefits?

A: No. Massachusetts PIP benefits are paid regardless of fault, and neither M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 34A nor sec. 34M contains any seat belt condition. Your own insurer owes those benefits after a covered accident whether or not you were buckled.

Q: What if my child was not in a car seat or booster seat? Is that different from the seatbelt rule?

A: Yes, and this is the situation where a real statutory shield applies. M.G.L. c. 90, sec. 7AA requires a child passenger restraint for a passenger under 8 who is not over 57 inches tall, and a safety belt for a passenger under 13, and it then provides that a violation of that section shall not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in any civil action. See Massachusetts booster seat laws for the full explanation.

Q: The adjuster told me my settlement would be lower because I wasn’t buckled. What do I do?

A: Do not negotiate that point on a recorded line, and speak with an attorney before you describe how you were seated or how you moved in the crash. Settlement talks are not governed by evidence rules, so an adjuster can raise it, but raising it is not the same as being able to prove it. No reported Massachusetts appellate decision has allowed a jury to reduce an award on that basis, and the causation proof required by Shahzade is expensive and often unavailable.

Q: Is the seat belt defense allowed in Massachusetts or not?

A: It is unresolved. Three appellate decisions have addressed it and all three declined to decide it: Breault v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mass. 352 (1973), MacCuish v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 380 (1986), and Shahzade v. C.J. Mabardy, Inc., 411 Mass. 788 (1992). Each defendant lost on the record it brought rather than on a rule of law. Anyone who tells you Massachusetts has banned the defense, or that Massachusetts has adopted it, is overstating what the courts have actually said.

Q: How long do I have to file a personal-injury lawsuit in Massachusetts after a car accident?

A: Generally three years from the date of the accident under M.G.L. c. 260, sec. 2A. See: Massachusetts Personal Injury Statute of Limitations for the full analysis, including exceptions that can shorten or extend that deadline.

Q: Is Jimmy Knows AI giving me legal advice?

A: No. This article provides general Massachusetts legal information. It is not legal advice for your specific situation. Call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS for advice about your particular claim.

This article is general legal information, not legal advice, and does not create an attorney-client relationship. Massachusetts law is fact-specific; telephone Jim Glaser Law about your particular situation. Past results do not guarantee future outcomes. Attorney advertising under Mass. R. Prof. C. 7.1 to 7.5. Responsible attorney: Jim Glaser, admitted in MA only, of counsel to Keches Law. Principal office: 77 Pond St., Sharon, MA. Most cases referred to other jurisdictionally licensed lawyers for principal liability.

Jim Glaser Law

Request a call back

Leave a phone number or email. The firm reaches out within one business day. Nothing here creates an attorney-client relationship.

Or call now (617) JIM-WINS