Can You Be Fired While on Workers Comp in Massachusetts?

Yes, and that surprises almost everyone who asks. Massachusetts is an at will state, and filing a workers compensation claim does not freeze your job in place or convert you into a protected employee. What the law does is narrower and more specific than the protection people imagine: under M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 75B(2), no employer may discharge you, refuse to hire you, or otherwise discriminate against you because you exercised a right under the workers compensation act, or because you testified or cooperated in a proceeding under it. So a layoff that would have happened anyway is lawful. A termination aimed at the claim is not. The remedy is also not where people expect it: a sec. 75B case is filed in the Superior Court for the county where the violation happened, not at the Department of Industrial Accidents, and an employer found to have violated it owes lost wages, must grant suitable employment, and must reimburse reasonable attorney fees as the court determines. Your medical and wage benefits under the claim itself are a separate track and do not end because the job did. To talk through a Massachusetts workers compensation termination, call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS. The line is answered 24 hours a day. The first telephone consultation is free.

At Will Is the Baseline, and the Claim Does Not Suspend It

Start with the rule the exceptions are carved out of, because every honest answer to this question depends on it. Massachusetts employment is presumed to be at will. Absent a contract, a collective bargaining agreement, or a statute that says otherwise, either side can end the relationship at any time, for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.

Filing a workers compensation claim does not repeal that presumption. There is no provision anywhere in chapter 152 that says an employee with an open claim cannot be let go, and there is no waiting period an employer has to sit through before making a staffing decision. If your department is eliminated in a reduction in force while you are out on a compensable back injury, the injury does not exempt you from the reduction.

This is the part that is worth being blunt about, because a person who believes their job is legally frozen will wait, will not document anything, and will discover the truth after the evidence has gone cold. The protection you have is real and it is worth using. It is just not the protection most people think they have.

What Section 75B Actually Prohibits

Here is the operative sentence, from M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 75B(2), in the statute’s own words:

No employer or duly authorized agent of an employer shall discharge, refuse to hire or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has exercised a right afforded by this chapter, or who has testified or in any manner cooperated with an inquiry or proceeding pursuant to this chapter, unless the employee knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding.

Read that slowly, because four separate things are doing work in it.

The prohibited acts are broader than firing. Discharge is named first, but so is refusing to hire, and then the catch all: to in any other manner discriminate against the employee. A demotion, a schedule change that functions as a punishment, a transfer to a worse assignment, a sudden and unexplained loss of overtime, or a refusal to rehire a seasonal worker who claimed last year all sit inside that language. The section is not limited to the moment of termination.

It reaches applicants, not only current staff. Refuse to hire is in the text. A prospective employer who declines you because a background check turned up a prior workers compensation claim is inside the section’s plain terms, even though you never worked a day there.

The trigger is exercising a right, or cooperating. The protection does not require that you won your claim, or that the claim was even ultimately compensable. It attaches to the exercise of a right afforded by chapter 152. Reporting an injury, filing a claim, attending an impartial medical examination, appearing at a conference, and giving testimony are all exercises of rights under the chapter. The second clause extends the same protection to someone who testified or in any manner cooperated with an inquiry or proceeding, which is what protects a coworker who backs up your account of what happened.

The word that decides most cases is “because.” The statute does not prohibit firing an employee who has a claim. It prohibits firing an employee because the employee has a claim. That single word is where these cases are won and lost, and everything in the section below about proof is really about that word.

Answer Capsule

You can be fired while on workers compensation in Massachusetts, because the state is at will and a claim does not suspend that. What M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 75B(2) prohibits is discharging, refusing to hire, or otherwise discriminating against you because you exercised a right under the workers compensation act or cooperated with a proceeding under it, with one exception written into the text for an employee who knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding. A sec. 75B claim is filed in the Superior Court for the county where the violation occurred, not at the Department of Industrial Accidents, and an employer found to have violated the paragraph is exclusively liable to pay lost wages, must grant the employee suitable employment, and must reimburse reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court, which may also grant whatever equitable relief it deems necessary. A separate route exists under M.G.L. c. 151B, because sec. 75B(1) deems an injured worker who can perform a job’s essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, to be a qualified handicapped person, and a complaint under c. 151B, sec. 5 must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. Losing the job does not end the claim: medical and wage benefits run on their own track.

The Remedy Is the Superior Court, Not the DIA

This trips up people who have spent months inside the workers compensation system and reasonably assume that everything about their claim happens there.

It does not. The Department of Industrial Accidents handles the claim: whether the injury is compensable, what your average weekly wage is, which benefits you receive and for how long, and disputes about medical treatment. A retaliation claim under sec. 75B is a different animal, and the statute routes it somewhere else. In its own words, any person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of this section may initiate proceedings in the superior court department of the trial court for the county in which the alleged violation occurred.

The remedies the section then sets out are specific, and they are worth knowing before you decide whether the fight is worth having. An employer found to have violated the paragraph:

• shall be exclusively liable to pay to the employee lost wages
• shall grant the employee suitable employment
• shall reimburse such reasonable attorney fees incurred in the protection of rights granted as shall be determined by the court

and beyond those three, the court may grant whatever equitable relief it deems necessary to protect rights granted by this section.

Two of those deserve a second look. The attorney fee provision matters because it changes the economics of a case that might otherwise be too small to bring: the statute contemplates the employer reimbursing your reasonable fees, in an amount the court determines. And the suitable employment remedy is unusual, because it is not damages. It is the job.

The county rule is worth reading literally as well. Venue is the county in which the alleged violation occurred, which is not automatically the county where you live, and not automatically where the injury happened either. If you were injured at a site in one county and fired from an office in another, that is a question to sort out before filing rather than after. If your case is a Middlesex or a Suffolk County matter, the divisions and the amount thresholds for each are set out in our guides to which court hears a Middlesex County case and which court hears a Suffolk County case.

Section 75A: The Rehiring Preference Almost Nobody Claims

One section earlier sits a provision that gets very little attention and occasionally solves the whole problem. M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 75A:

Any person who has lost a job as a result of an injury compensable under this chapter shall be given preference in hiring by the employer for whom he worked at the time of compensable injury over any persons not at the time of application for reemployment employed by such employer; provided, however, that a suitable job is available.

Notice what this does and does not do. It is not reinstatement, and it does not require the employer to create a position. It is a preference, and it operates only when a suitable job is available. But within those limits it is a real obligation: when your former employer is hiring for a suitable position, you are entitled to preference over any outside candidate, meaning anyone not already employed there when you apply.

It has to be triggered by an application. Nothing in the section obliges an employer to come find you. If you lost the job as a result of a compensable injury and you want the preference, you apply, in writing, and you keep the copy.

The remedies mirror sec. 75B: Superior Court for the county where the violation occurred, and an employer found to have violated it owes lost wages, must grant a suitable job, and must reimburse reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court. Sec. 75A adds one wrinkle sec. 75B does not have: where the section conflicts with an applicable collective bargaining agreement or with c. 31, the civil service law, the agreement or c. 31 prevails.

The Second Route: Chapter 151B and the Disability Statute

Sec. 75B(1) does something easy to skim past, and it can matter more than the anti retaliation paragraph:

Any employee who has sustained a work-related injury and is capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the essential functions of such job with reasonable accommodations, shall be deemed to be a qualified handicapped person under the provisions of chapter one hundred and fifty-one B.

That sentence moves an injured worker into the Massachusetts anti discrimination statute. The practical consequence is that the argument is no longer only “you fired me for claiming.” It can also be “I could do this job, with an accommodation you were required to consider, and you did not.” Chapter 151B carries its own duty to engage over reasonable accommodation, and its own machinery at the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination.

The deadline on that route is short and it is fixed by statute. Under M.G.L. c. 151B, sec. 5, any complaint filed pursuant to this section must be so filed within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination. Three hundred days is roughly ten months. It runs from the discriminatory act, not from the day you finish treating, and not from the day your claim resolves.

Sec. 75B(2) itself contains no limitations period at all. Its text sets a forum and a remedy and says nothing about time. That is a genuine open question rather than a secret, and it is the reason this article does not print a number for it. Do not assume the sec. 75B window is as long as the three years M.G.L. c. 260, sec. 2A gives for actions of tort, and do not assume it is as short as 300 days either. Get the date pinned down by a lawyer looking at your specific facts, early, because the cheapest deadline problem is the one caught while there is still time.

What Proving “Because” Actually Looks Like

Employers rarely say it. Nobody writes “terminated for filing a workers compensation claim” on a separation form. So these cases are built out of ordinary, unglamorous evidence, most of which exists on the day you are fired and starts degrading immediately.

Timing. How many days between the claim, or the hearing, or the return to work with restrictions, and the adverse action? Close timing does not win a case by itself, but it is where every one of them starts.

The reason given, and whether it moved. A reason that changes is worth more than a reason that is weak. If the first explanation is a restructuring, the second is performance, and the third is attendance, that shifting is itself evidence.

How comparable employees were treated. If three people had the same attendance record and you are the one who was let go, the difference between you and them is the point.

Your own record before the injury. Reviews, raises, commendations, and the absence of any prior discipline. A sudden first written warning two weeks after a claim reads differently than the fifth warning in a documented pattern.

What people said out loud. Comments about the cost of the claim, about insurance premiums, about being “a liability,” about how long you have been out. Write them down the day you hear them, with the date and who else was present. Contemporaneous notes are worth far more later than a reconstruction.

Preserve the paper before you lose access to it. Employees are frequently cut off from email and internal systems within hours of a termination. Personal copies of your reviews, your offer letter, your handbook, the restriction notes you gave the employer, and any correspondence about accommodation are worth gathering now.

The Exception the Statute Writes Into Itself

Sec. 75B(2) carries one carve out, and it is in the same sentence as the protection: the prohibition applies unless the employee knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding.

Read it precisely. The word is knowingly, and the object is a fraudulent proceeding. A claim that gets denied is not fraud. A claim where the impartial physician disagrees with your treating doctor is not fraud. A claim you lose is not fraud. An employer who wants the benefit of this exception is asserting that you knowingly took part in a fraudulent proceeding, which is a serious allegation and one that has to be proved rather than implied.

Union Contracts Override, and You Cannot Waive on Your Own

Sec. 75B(3) sets two rules that pull in opposite directions:

In the event that any right set forth in this section is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining agreement, such agreement shall prevail. An employee may not otherwise waive rights granted by this section.

So a collective bargaining agreement can displace an inconsistent sec. 75B right. If you are in a union, the contract and its grievance procedure are part of the analysis from the beginning, and the timelines in a grievance procedure are usually far shorter than any statutory deadline. Talk to your steward early.

Outside of that, the second sentence is a floor. An individual employee cannot otherwise waive these rights, which is worth remembering when a severance agreement arrives with a broad release attached and a short deadline to sign it. Have it read before you sign it, not after.

Losing the Job Does Not End the Claim

This is the fear underneath the question, and the answer is reassuring. Your entitlement to workers compensation benefits comes from the injury and the insurer, not from your continued employment. Being fired does not cancel an accepted claim, does not stop authorized medical treatment, and does not by itself end wage replacement.

What termination can change is the arithmetic. Some benefit calculations turn on your earning capacity and on what suitable work is actually available to you, so a job loss can change the category of benefit you receive even while the claim continues. Our guides to how long workers comp lasts in Massachusetts and what workers comp pays for medical bills set out how those pieces fit together, and workers comp compared with disability benefits covers the overlap people most often get wrong.

One thing a job loss does not do is free the insurer to stop paying on its own judgment. M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 8(2) gives a closed list of the only situations in which an insurer already paying weekly benefits may modify or discontinue them, and the same section governs what an insurer can and cannot do with evidence it gathers about your activities. That mechanism, along with the examination duties that carry a suspension penalty, is set out in the article on travelling or taking a vacation while on workers comp.

If you are in the Merrimack Valley, our Lowell workers compensation page covers the same ground for that area. The Massachusetts statute of limitations by claim type guide collects the deadlines that govern the other claims that can run alongside a comp case.

What to Do in the First Week

1. Write down the sequence while it is fresh. Dates of the injury, the report, the claim, every restriction you gave the employer, every conversation about coming back, and the termination. Dates carry these cases.
2. Get the reason in writing. Ask for the stated reason for the separation in writing. Do not argue with it in the moment. Just get it recorded, because a reason that later changes is evidence.
3. Take your documents home. Reviews, the handbook, offer letter, medical restriction notes, accommodation correspondence, and any emails about the claim.
4. Do not sign the severance agreement yet. Releases are usually broad enough to cover a sec. 75B claim you have not yet identified. There is normally a period to consider it. Use it.
5. Keep treating, and keep the claim moving. The claim is a separate track and it continues.
6. Apply in writing for any suitable opening. Sec. 75A preference only works if you applied.
7. Get the deadlines pinned down early. The 300 day chapter 151B window is fixed and it is shorter than people expect.

What This Does Not Decide

This article is general information about how Massachusetts law treats the question, and it is not advice about your situation. Whether a particular termination violated sec. 75B turns on facts this article cannot see: what the employer knew and when, what was said, how others were treated, what your contract or collective bargaining agreement says, and what the documents show. Most people in this position also have an ongoing workers compensation claim, and the two proceedings interact.

Jim Glaser Law can talk through where you stand at (617) JIM-WINS. The line is answered 24 hours a day. The first telephone consultation is free. If a case is taken on a contingency fee, the fee is a percentage of any recovery, and costs and expenses are handled separately from the fee under the written fee agreement.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: Can my employer fire me while I am out on workers comp in Massachusetts?

A: Yes. Massachusetts is an at will state and an open workers compensation claim does not suspend that. There is no provision in chapter 152 making an injured employee unfireable and no waiting period an employer must observe. What M.G.L. c. 152, sec. 75B(2) prohibits is discharging, refusing to hire, or in any other manner discriminating against you because you exercised a right under the chapter or cooperated with a proceeding under it. A layoff that would have happened regardless of the claim is lawful. A termination aimed at the claim is not, and the whole case usually turns on that distinction.

Q: Do I lose my workers comp benefits if I get fired?

A: No. Your entitlement to benefits comes from the compensable injury and runs against the insurer, not from your continued employment, so a termination does not cancel an accepted claim, stop authorized medical treatment, or by itself end wage replacement. What a job loss can change is which category of benefit applies, because some calculations depend on earning capacity and on what suitable work is actually available to you. The claim itself continues on its own track at the Department of Industrial Accidents.

Q: Where do I file a workers comp retaliation claim in Massachusetts?

A: In the Superior Court, not at the Department of Industrial Accidents. Sec. 75B(2) says a person claiming to be aggrieved may initiate proceedings in the superior court department of the trial court for the county in which the alleged violation occurred. The DIA handles the compensation claim itself. The retaliation claim is a civil action in a different forum, and venue follows the county where the violation happened, which is not necessarily where you live or where you were injured.

Q: What can I recover if my employer violated section 75B?

A: The statute names three things and then adds a fourth. An employer found to have violated the paragraph is exclusively liable to pay the employee lost wages, shall grant the employee suitable employment, and shall reimburse such reasonable attorney fees incurred in the protection of rights granted as shall be determined by the court. Beyond those, the court may grant whatever equitable relief it deems necessary to protect the rights the section grants. The attorney fee provision matters practically, because it makes a smaller case viable that otherwise would not be.

Q: How long do I have to bring a workers comp retaliation claim in Massachusetts?

A: Section 75B sets a forum and a remedy but contains no limitations period in its own text, so the deadline for a sec. 75B action is not something this article will put a number on. The related route does have a fixed statutory deadline: because sec. 75B(1) deems an injured worker who can perform a job’s essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, to be a qualified handicapped person under chapter 151B, a complaint under M.G.L. c. 151B, sec. 5 must be filed within 300 days after the alleged act of discrimination. Three hundred days is roughly ten months and it runs from the act, not from the end of your treatment. Because one route has a short fixed deadline and the other is not settled on the face of the statute, this is worth asking a lawyer about early rather than late.

Q: Does my employer have to give me my job back?

A: Not automatically, and there are two different provisions people confuse here. Sec. 75A gives a preference, not reinstatement: a person who lost a job as a result of a compensable injury shall be given preference in hiring by that employer over any person not employed there at the time of application, provided, however, that a suitable job is available. It requires you to apply, and it does not require the employer to create a position. Separately, if a court finds a sec. 75B violation, the statute says the employer shall grant the employee suitable employment, which is a remedy for a proven violation rather than an automatic right on termination.

Q: My employer says I committed fraud. Does that end my protection?

A: Only if it is true and provable in the specific sense the statute uses. The exception in sec. 75B(2) applies unless the employee knowingly participated in a fraudulent proceeding. Both words carry weight. A denied claim is not fraud, a claim where an impartial physician disagrees with your treating doctor is not fraud, and a claim you ultimately lose is not fraud. An employer invoking this exception is making a serious allegation that has to be proved rather than asserted.

Q: I am in a union. Does any of this change?

A: Yes, in two ways. Sec. 75B(3) provides that where a right in the section is inconsistent with an applicable collective bargaining agreement, the agreement prevails, and sec. 75A carries the same rule plus a reference to c. 31, the civil service law. So the contract is part of the analysis from the start. The grievance timelines in a collective bargaining agreement are also usually far shorter than any statutory deadline, which means talking to your steward early matters. The same subsection adds that an employee may not otherwise waive rights granted by the section, which is worth remembering when a severance agreement with a broad release arrives.

Q: Is Jimmy Knows AI giving me legal advice?

A: No. This article provides general Massachusetts legal information, not legal advice for your specific situation. For advice about your particular claim, call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS.