What Is a 93A Demand Letter in Massachusetts?

A 93A demand letter is a written demand for relief that Massachusetts law requires a consumer to send before filing a Chapter 93A lawsuit. Under M.G.L. c. 93A, sec. 9(3), the letter has to be mailed or delivered at least thirty days before the action is filed, and it has to identify the claimant and reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered. The recipient then has thirty days to make a written tender of settlement. That is the mechanical answer. The reason the letter matters so much in Massachusetts injury cases is a second statute sitting behind it: M.G.L. c. 93A, sec. 9(1) gives a right of action to any person whose rights are affected by a violation of clause (9) of section 3 of chapter 176D, which is the list of unfair claim settlement practices that insurance companies are forbidden to engage in. Put those two together and Massachusetts is one of the few states where a person injured by someone else can go directly at the other side’s insurer over how the claim was handled. If a court finds the violation was willful or knowing, or that relief was refused in bad faith after the demand, sec. 9(3) provides for recovery of up to three but not less than two times the amount, and sec. 9(4) provides for reasonable attorney fees and costs. This article explains what the letter has to contain, what happens in the thirty days after it goes out, and what it cannot do. It is general information about Massachusetts law and not legal advice. To talk through a specific situation, call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS. The line is answered 24 hours a day. The first telephone consultation is offered without charge.

What Chapter 93A Actually Says

Chapter 93A is the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. Section 2(a) is one sentence and it is deliberately broad: “Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.” Section 2(c) lets the attorney general issue regulations interpreting that sentence, consistent with the Federal Trade Commission Act.

Section 9 is the part a consumer uses. Section 9(1) says who may sue, and the wording is worth reading closely, because it contains two separate doors:

• A person “who has been injured by another person’s use or employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by section two or any rule or regulation issued thereunder.”
• “Any person whose rights are affected by another person violating the provisions of clause (9) of section three of chapter one hundred and seventy-six D.”

The second door is the insurance door. Chapter 176D, section 3(9) is a list of unfair claim settlement practices. Ordinarily an insurance statute would only give rights to the insurer’s own policyholder. This clause is why a person hurt by someone else’s driver, who has no contract with that driver’s insurance company at all, can still be a person whose rights are affected.

Answer Capsule

A 93A demand letter is the written demand for relief that M.G.L. c. 93A, sec. 9(3) requires a consumer to mail or deliver at least thirty days before filing a Chapter 93A action. The statute requires it to identify the claimant and reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered. The recipient has thirty days to respond with a written tender of settlement; if that tender is rejected, it can be filed with the answer, and the court may limit recovery to the relief tendered if it finds the tender was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered. In Massachusetts injury cases the letter matters because sec. 9(1) extends the right of action to any person whose rights are affected by a violation of clause (9) of section 3 of chapter 176D, the unfair claim settlement practices list, which includes failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications about claims, failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for prompt investigation, refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information, and failing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. If a court finds the conduct was a willful or knowing violation of sec. 2, or that relief was refused in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know of the violation, sec. 9(3) provides for recovery of up to three but not less than two times the amount, and the amount multiplied is the judgment on all claims arising out of the same underlying transaction or occurrence, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage. Section 9(4) provides for reasonable attorney fees and costs irrespective of the amount in controversy. Consumer protection claims must be brought within four years under M.G.L. c. 260, sec. 5A. A demand letter is not required where the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or keep assets within the commonwealth, and section 11, which covers business-to-business claims, has no demand requirement at all. Call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS; the first telephone consultation is free.

What the Letter Has to Contain

Section 9(3) sets a low formal bar and a high practical one. The statutory requirement is that the letter identify the claimant and reasonably describe two things: the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon, and the injury suffered. There is no prescribed form, no filing fee and no court involvement. It is a letter.

What that means in practice is that the letter has to do four jobs at once.

It has to name the right recipient. A demand aimed at a claims adjuster personally, or at a company that is not the entity that did the thing complained of, is a weaker document than one addressed to the party that will have to answer for it.

It has to describe the conduct, not the injury alone. This is the mistake that costs people the most. A letter that recites a broken leg and a hospital bill has described an injury, but it has not described an unfair or deceptive act or practice. The conduct being complained of is the handling: the calls that went unanswered, the investigation that was never done, the liability that was clear months ago.

It has to describe the injury suffered as a result. Under the insurance door, the injury is often the loss caused by the handling itself, such as being kept out of a settlement that should have been paid, on top of the underlying loss.

It has to make a demand. A letter that describes conduct and asks for nothing gives the recipient nothing to tender against, and the thirty-day response window is built around the idea that there is something specific to accept or reject.

The Chapter 176D List

Clause (9) of section 3 of chapter 176D is the standard an insurer’s conduct gets measured against. Four of its items come up most often after a Massachusetts crash, and they are quoted here in the statute’s own words.

• (b) “Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.”
• (c) “Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies.”
• (d) “Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information.”
• (f) “Failing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.”

Item (f) is the one that does the most work in an injury case, and the phrase to sit with is “liability has become reasonably clear.” It is not the same as liability being admitted, and it is not the same as damages being agreed. It describes a point in a claim after which continuing to withhold a fair settlement stops being negotiation. Establishing when that point arrived, and what the insurer knew when it arrived, is usually the substance of a 93A claim built on this clause.

Notice what these four items have in common. Every one of them is about process rather than price. A low offer, standing alone, is a low offer. An offer made without a reasonable investigation, or long after liability stopped being in doubt, or in the middle of months of unanswered communications, is a different thing, and the record of the claim is where that difference shows up. This is one reason what you say to an adjuster and whether you gave a recorded statement matter beyond the moment.

What Happens During the Thirty Days

Once the letter is delivered, the clock in sec. 9(3) starts and three things can happen.

Nothing. Silence for thirty days is itself a fact in the case, because the statute contemplates that a respondent who believes it has behaved properly can say so and can tender what it thinks is fair.

A written tender of settlement. The respondent may make a written offer within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of the demand. This is the response the statute is designed to encourage, and it is why a well-drafted demand letter sometimes resolves a claim without a suit.

A tender that gets rejected. This is where the statute has teeth pointing in both directions. If the claimant rejects the tender, the respondent may file evidence of the tender with its answer, and the court may limit any recovery to the relief tendered if it finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered. A reasonable tender, rejected, can cap the case. That is a real risk and it is the reason a demand should be sent with the underlying evidence in hand rather than as an opening gambit.

Multiple Damages and What Actually Gets Multiplied

Section 9(3) provides for recovery of up to three but not less than two times the amount, on either of two findings by the court: that the use or employment of the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of section 2, or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know that the act or practice complained of violated section 2.

The second of those findings is the one created by the letter. Before the demand goes out, there is no refusal upon demand, because there has been no demand.

The other half of the sentence is the half most people miss, and it is the reason 93A is discussed so much in Massachusetts injury practice. The statute specifies that the amount to be multiplied is “the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage.” The multiplier does not attach only to some separate, smaller pot of consumer-protection damages. It attaches to the judgment on the underlying claims arising out of the same occurrence.

None of this is automatic. Every word of it depends on findings a court has to make about willfulness, knowledge and bad faith, on the evidence in a specific claim file. The statute describes what a court may do; it does not describe what will happen in any particular case.

Attorney Fees

Section 9(4) is short and it changes the economics of small claims: “The petitioner shall, in addition to other relief provided for by this section and irrespective of the amount in controversy, be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection with said action.”

“Irrespective of the amount in controversy” is the operative phrase. It means a claim too small to be worth litigating on its own merits can still be worth bringing, which is the mechanism the legislature used to make the consumer-protection right real rather than theoretical.

When the Letter Is Not Required

There are two situations worth knowing about.

The respondent has no Massachusetts presence. Section 9(3) provides that the demand requirement does not apply if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the commonwealth.

The claim is between businesses. Section 11 covers “any person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce and who suffers any loss of money or property.” It contains no written-demand precondition, so a business claimant may proceed directly. The multiplier language is parallel: up to three but not less than two times the amount on a willful or knowing violation, and a settlement offer that the court finds reasonable, if rejected, limits recovery to single damages.

Section 9(1) also expressly contemplates the claim being raised “whether by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party action,” which matters when a 93A issue surfaces in a case that is already under way.

The Four-Year Clock

Chapter 93A claims are governed by M.G.L. c. 260, sec. 5A, which requires actions for violations of laws intended for the protection of consumers to be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. That is a different and longer period than the three years that applies to an ordinary Massachusetts personal injury action, which is covered in the statute of limitations for personal injury in Massachusetts.

Longer is not the same as safe. A 93A claim about claim handling usually depends on the underlying injury claim, and if the underlying claim is time-barred the 93A claim built on top of it is in a much harder position. Treat the shorter deadline as the one that governs.

What a Demand Letter Cannot Do

Three honest limits.

It does not create a claim that was not there. If liability is genuinely disputed on the facts, an insurer investigating and declining is doing the thing the statute asks of it. Chapter 176D, section 3(9)(f) is written around liability having become reasonably clear, and where it has not, disagreement is not an unfair practice.

It does not replace the underlying case. The value of an injury claim still comes from the medical records, the crash report, the wage loss and the policies actually in play, which is the subject of how Massachusetts injury claims are valued. A 93A claim is about conduct layered on top of that; it is not a substitute for proving it.

It carries a downside. The reasonable-tender provision means a premature letter, sent before the evidence supports the number demanded, can invite a tender that later caps the recovery. The timing of the letter is a judgment call, and it is one of the main reasons this is a step people ask a lawyer about rather than handle alone.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: How long does the other side have to respond to a 93A demand letter in Massachusetts?

A: Thirty days. Under M.G.L. c. 93A, sec. 9(3) the demand must be mailed or delivered at least thirty days before the action is filed, and the recipient may make a written tender of settlement within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of the demand. If a tender is made and rejected, the respondent can file evidence of it with its answer, and the court may limit any recovery to the relief tendered if it finds that tender was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered.

Q: What has to be in a 93A demand letter?

A: The statute requires the letter to identify the claimant and to reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered. There is no required form. The practical requirement is broader than the statutory one: the letter has to name a respondent that can actually answer for the conduct, describe the handling rather than only the injury, connect that handling to a loss, and make a specific demand the recipient can accept or reject inside the thirty days.

Q: Can I send a 93A letter to the other driver’s insurance company?

A: Massachusetts is unusual in allowing it. Section 9(1) of chapter 93A extends the right of action to any person whose rights are affected by another person violating clause (9) of section 3 of chapter 176D, which is the unfair claim settlement practices list. That clause is what lets someone with no policy and no contract with an insurer complain about how that insurer handled the claim against its own insured. Whether the facts of a particular claim support it is a separate question from whether the door exists.

Q: What are unfair claim settlement practices under Massachusetts law?

A: They are listed in M.G.L. c. 176D, sec. 3(9). Four that come up regularly after a crash are failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims arising under insurance policies, failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims, refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information, and failing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. Every one of them is about the process of handling a claim rather than the size of an offer.

Q: Does a 93A demand letter mean triple damages?

A: No. Section 9(3) provides that a court may award up to three but not less than two times the amount, but only on a finding that the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of section 2, or that the refusal to grant relief upon demand was made in bad faith with knowledge or reason to know of the violation. Those are findings a court makes on evidence, not consequences of sending a letter. What the demand does is create the possibility of the second finding, because until a demand has been made there can be no refusal upon demand.

Q: What gets multiplied if a court awards multiple damages?

A: Section 9(3) specifies that the amount to be multiplied is the amount of the judgment on all claims arising out of the same and underlying transaction or occurrence, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of insurance coverage. The multiplier is directed at the judgment on the underlying claims rather than at a separate consumer-protection figure, which is why 93A is discussed so often alongside serious injury claims in Massachusetts.

Q: How long do I have to bring a 93A claim in Massachusetts?

A: Four years. M.G.L. c. 260, sec. 5A requires actions for violations of laws intended for the protection of consumers to be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. That is longer than the three-year period for an ordinary personal injury action, but a 93A claim about claim handling usually rides on the underlying injury claim, so the shorter deadline is the one to plan around.

Q: Do I need a lawyer to send a 93A demand letter?

A: No rule requires one. The statute sets out what the letter must contain and anyone may write it. The reasons people bring a lawyer into it are the reasonable-tender provision, which means a letter sent too early can invite an offer that later limits recovery, and the fact that a demand built on chapter 176D depends on documenting the claim history rather than the injury. The attorney fee provision in sec. 9(4) exists partly so that getting help does not require the claim to be large.

Q: Is Jimmy Knows AI giving me legal advice?

A: No. This is general information about Massachusetts law, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship. Chapter 93A outcomes turn on findings a court makes about specific conduct in a specific claim file, and nothing here describes what would happen in any particular case. For advice about a specific situation, call Jim Glaser Law at (617) JIM-WINS.

Talking to a Lawyer

The thing worth taking from Chapter 93A is that in Massachusetts the way a claim is handled is itself a legal question, separate from who hit whom. Unanswered calls, an investigation that never happened, liability that stopped being in doubt months before an offer arrived: those facts have a statute attached to them, and the record of them lives in the claim file rather than in the medical records.

If that describes what is happening on a claim, the useful steps are ordinary ones. Keep the dates. Keep the letters and the emails. Note when liability stopped being genuinely in dispute and what the insurer knew by then. That record is what a demand letter is written from, and it is much easier to assemble as the claim goes along than to reconstruct afterward.

Jim Glaser Law handles Massachusetts injury claims and the insurance disputes that come with them, including claims where the at-fault driver’s insurer is the obstacle and claims that stall on coverage. Fees are contingent, meaning no fee unless there is a recovery, and the client may be responsible for costs and expenses.

The number is (617) JIM-WINS. The line is answered 24 hours a day. The first telephone consultation is offered without charge.